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SHOULD JURY TRIAL BE REQUIRED IN CIVIL
CASES? A Challenge to the Seventh Amendment*
EDWARD J. DEVITT**
Mark Twain once told us:
"The jury system puts a ban upon intelligence and
honesty, and a premium upon ignorance, stupidity, and
perjury. It is a shame that we must continue to use a
worthless system because it was good a thousand years ago."'
S THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT requirement for jury
trial in civil cases a worthless part of our legal system as
Mark Twain wrote over a hundred years ago? Do citizen ju-
rors have the competence to understand and decide the com-
plicated issues of fact and law involved in protracted technical
and business law suits so common on court dockets today? As
the only nation in the world constitutionally requiring civil
jury trial, we should ask ourselves whether this is the best
method of decision making or whether we have an unreasona-
ble fetish for the jury.2
*This article is an adaptation of the Alfred P. Murrah Lecture on Judicial Admin-
istration, delivered by Judge Devitt on Nov. 11, 1981, at Southern Methodist Univer-
sity School of Law.
**Senior United States District Judge, United States District Court for the District
of Minnesota. Author, E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND IN-
STRUCTIONS, CIVIL AND CRIMINAL (3rd ed. 1977). I would like to thank my law clerk,
Mary E. Bolkcom (William Mitchell College of Law in St. Paul, J.D., 1980) for her
assistance in preparing this article.
2 M. TWAIN, Roughing It, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF MARK TWAIN 309 (1972).
2 We have had an ever growing debate on this important question in recent years.
See, e.g., Harris & Liberman, Can the Jury Survive the Complex Antitrust Case?, 24
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 611 (1979); Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil Juries
and the Allocation of Judicial Power, 56 TEx. L. REV. 47 (1977); Kirkham, Complex
Civil Litigation: Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70 F.R.D. 199 (1976); Redish,
Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of Rational
Decision Making, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 486 (1975); Sperlich, The Case for Preserving
Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 65 JUDICATURE 394 (1982); Comment, The
Right to an Incompetent Jury: Protracted Commercial Litigation and the Seventh
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The complexities of modern life mirrored in our legal sys-
tem raise the increasingly important question of whether a
jury selected from voter lists, reflecting the age, education,
and experience of a cross section of citizens is really compe-
tent to decide today's complex cases. I suggest that many
cases, by their very nature, are beyond the abilities of the av-
erage person to understand and fairly decide. Because of the
required trial time and the complexity and difficulty of the
legal and factual issues involved, certain cases should not be
submitted to juries. I urge that modern realities dictate that
we change the obligatory jury system in civil cases in order to
preserve fair trials and to improve the efficiency and economy
of the whole legal system.
I. ORIGINS OF THE JURY TRIAL
The civil jury is deeply rooted in American legal tradition.
Long before the founding of our nation, the jury was an im-
portant institution for English-speaking people. Indeed, the
idea for trial by jury is said to have been originated by an
Eighth Century Welsh king.3 Blackstone, moreover, called it
"the glory of the English law."" One of the principal com-
plaints of the American colonists was the British Crown's de-
nial of the right to trial by jury and this grievance received
forceful expression in the Declaration of Independence.5
The understandable desire of the American people for trial
by jury in civil cases was thereafter included in the Bill of
Rights as the seventh amendment to the United States Con-
stitution.' The jury was also an integral component of our le-
Amendment, 10 CONN. L. REV. 775 (1978); Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in Com-
plex Civil Litigation, 92 HARV. L. REV. 898 (1979); Note, The Right to Trial by Jury
in Complex Litigation, 20 WM. & MARY L. REV. 329 (1978).
" Williams v. Florida, 399 U. S. 78, 89 n.23 (1970) (citing PROFFATT, TRIAL BY JURY
11 n.2 (1877)). There is an absence of consensus on the origination of the jury. See M.
BLOOMSTEIN, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM, CURRENT HISTORY 357 (1971). See also L.
MOORE, THE JURY, TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY (1973).
4 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 379.
" One of the grievances against King George III enumerated in the Declaration of
Independence was "depriving us, in many cases, of the benefits of trial by jury." The
Declaration of Independence para. 19 (U.S. 1776).
' The seventh amendment provides: "In suits at common law, where the value in
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gal system as the country expanded westward. In those times,
notwithstanding the distance from established machinery of
the legal system, justice could still be effectively dispensed
through jury trials.
Over the past two centuries, our nation has become very at-
tached to the idea of jury trial. Its use effectively reflects com-
munity values, insures the injection of common sense into our
legal system and affords an opportunity for participatory
democracy.
II. PROBLEMS WITH COMPLEX LITIGATION
However, we live in a different age now and our society has
grown increasingly complex, as has our legal system. In earlier
times, a jury might have been called upon to sit for a day or
two to consider a simple dispute between neighbors.8 Today,
however, a jury often finds itself sitting for many months, at-
tempting to assimilate mountains of evidence in controversies
pitting large corporations against each other in complicated
cases involving antitrust, securities, tax, patent, and similar
business related issues.
The Federal Judicial Center recently completed a study of
protracted and complex litigation. This study defined any
civil trial lasting over nineteen trial days or 100 trial hours as
a "protracted" case.9 Over the period studied, 1977-79, trials
lasting twenty days or more accounted for seven percent of
total trial days in civil trials in federal courts. The great num-
ber of these lengthy trials were concentrated in antitrust, civil
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of common law." U. S. Const. amend. VII.
" The U.S. Jury System, Pros & Cons, 50 CONG. DIG. 193, 194 (1971).
a At the time the seventh amendment was adopted, the practice of adjourning ju-
ries in England was disfavored, and adjournment rarely was granted. A long case was
one that might take twelve or fourteen hours to try. See Devlin, Jury Trial of Com-
plex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 43, 58, 67 n.89 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Devlin].
9 G. BERMANT, J. CECIL, A. CHASET, E. LIND & P. LOMBARD, PROTRACTED CIVIL Tm-
ALS: VIEWS FROM THE BENCH AND THE BAR, at vii (Federal Judicial Center 1981) [here-
inafter cited as FJC STUDY].
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rights, and diversity contract cases.' 0 Although length of trial
time is not necessarily determinative of complexity, it is one
factor to be considered in identifying the complex case. The
Judicial Center Study found a high correlation between length
of trial and complex cases."
A lengthy trial, whether defined as complex or not, may
make it impossible to impanel a jury of "impartial minds of
diverse backgrounds.' 1 2 It is unrealistic to suppose that em-
ployed persons, who compose the group most likely to have
any familiarity with business matters of the type frequently at
issue in lengthy litigation, would be available for jury service
in lengthy trials.'" Judge Charles L. Brieant of the Southern
District of New York aptly put it: "[M]ust litigants be left
with a panel consisting solely of retired people, the idle rich,
those on welfare, and housewives whose children are grown?
Hardly a 'fair cross section of the community wherein the
court convenes.' "'1
Recent decisions illustrate obvious examples of the ex-
tremely complex case.' 6 The Japanese Electronic Products
10 Id. at 70-71.
Id. at 84.
In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99, 104 (W.D. Wash. 1976) (esti-
mated trial time of four to six months).
" See Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 69-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In
re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 75 F.R.D. 702, 713 (S.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 609 F.2d
411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom., Gant v. Union Bank, 446 U.S. 929 (1980).
In ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 458 F. Supp.
423 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd on other grounds sub nom., Memorex Corp. v. Interna-
tional Business Mach. Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), a trial in-
volving complex antitrust issues was projected to last 10 months. Because of the ex-
pected duration of the trial, a special pool of 174 jurors was called. After excuses only
29 potential jurors remained from which to select 14 jurors. Of the 11 jurors to whom
the case was submitted, only one juror had even limited technical education. 458 F.
Supp. at 448. The jury deadlocked and the court declared a mistrial. Id. at 426. In
granting a directed verdict, the court stated that in the event of a remand the jury
demand would be stricken due to the inability of a jury to decide a case of such
complexity. Id. at 448-49. The striking of the jury demand would undoubtedly have
been reversed by the court of appeals had it reached the issue on appeal. See Memo-
rex Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980).
" Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
" See, e.g., ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp.,
458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd per curiarn on other grounds sub noma.,
Memorex Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980)
(jury demand stricken in event of remand after five month trial resulting in a mistrial
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case,16 decided in 1980 by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals,
held that the plaintiffs' demand for a jury trial should be
stricken because the case was too complicated for a jury to
decide rationally. This case involved complex claims of viola-
tions of antitrust and antidumping laws brought by major do-
mestic producers of electronic equipment against numerous
Japanese corporate defendants. Plaintiffs alleged, among
other things, a conspiracy involving over ninety co-conspira-
tors worldwide to maintain artificially low prices on Japanese
products sold in the United States.17 Equally complicated
counterclaims were asserted. 18 Discovery lasting nine years
produced millions of documents and more than 100,000 pages
of deposition transcripts."' It was estimated that the trial
would last a year or more, and the jury would be required to
resolve many complicated financial issues.2 0
The Japanese Electronic Products case well may be an ex-
treme example of the complex case, but the threshold for the
level of complexity which should caution against the use of a
jury is much lower than that. In the study recently completed
by the Federal Judicial Center,2 1 diversity contract disputes
were identified as a complex casetype on the basis of several
additional criteria, such as the nature of the evidence. I have
observed juries, in cases that did not involve particularly long
trials or issues typically identified as complex, which were
completely befuddled by the evidence. A case that comes rap-
because of a deadlocked jury in antitrust case involving complex computer technology
and financial issues, at which 87 witnesses were called and 2300 exhibits introduced
into evidence); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(jury demand stricken in class action antitrust litigation requiring proof of injury and
damages by each member of large class involving multiple defendants, complex ac-
counting issues, and a projected trial time of at least four months); In re Boise Cas-
cade Sec. Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976) (jury demand stricken in
securites fraud litigation involving multiple plaintiffs, extremely complex accounting
and proof questions, with more than 50,000 lawyer hours expended and over 900,000
documents produced in pretrial stage).
'6 In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
17 Id. at 1072.
'6 Id. at 1072-73.
" Id. at 1073.
20 Id.
2 See FJC STUDY, supra note 9, at 76-77.
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idly to mind involved what many lawyers would consider a
run-of-the-mill contract dispute concerning issues relating to
contract formation and agency. The trial lasted eight days.
The jury's verdict clearly indicated that the members failed to
understand both the factual issues and the law.2
Studies of this subject suggest that factual issues presented
in a case can be considered complex, either when the facts
needing resolution are conceptually difficult for a non-special-
ist to understand, or when the facts are made difficult by the
volume of evidentiary material needed to establish them.23 It
also has been suggested that legal issues can be considered
complex when they are multiple, overlapping, ambiguous, or
pose issues requiring instructions on close questions of statu-
tory interpretation.2 Even with instructions carefully crafted
with an eye toward clarity and simplicity, it is practically im-
possible in some specialized fields of law to guide a jury
through the awesome job of rationally applying complex in-
structions to a huge volume of technical evidence.
, In the actual case, it was necessary to grant a new trial which required a retrial
before a new jury. In contrast, if the case had been tried before a judge without a
jury, and an appellate court later reversed the trial judge's findings of fact and con-
clusions of law, much of the prior trial proceedings could be salvaged upon remand.
See Day v. Amax, No. 3-78-55 (D. Minn. Oct. 29, 1980) (order granting motion for
new trial).
13 FJC STUDY, supra note 9, at 22. Illustrative is the case of In re Data Gen. Corp.
Antitrust Litig., 529 F. Supp. 801 (N.D. Cal. 1981), described in Legal Times of
Washington, March 15, 1982, at 10, 61. The plaintiffs had imposed illegal antitrust
restraints tying Data General's computer software products to its hardware products.
529 F. Supp. at 805. The case did not present necessarily complex legal issues, but
did involve complex factual issues concerning the economics and technology of the
computer industry and the need to define relevant markets. In discovery, 600,000
documents were produced and 150 depositions were taken. The trial judge rejected
prospective jurors with knowledge about computers in order to impanel a jury of im-
partial non-experts. At trial, the plaintiff's lawyers expended substantial effort to pre-
sent expert testimony and graphic exhibits to educate the jury about computer tech-
nology. The jury was allowed to ask written interrogatories through the course of the
proceedings. The trial lasted 45 days. The jury deliberated 9 days and returned a
general verdict and specific findings for the plaintiff. The trial judge granted a judg-
ment n.o.v., id. at 821-22, and the plaintiffs have appealed to the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit. Needless to say, the lawyers for the plaintiffs and defendants are
in sharp disagreement as to whether the jury understood the case.
FJC STUDY, supra note 9, at 5.
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III. INTERPRETATION OF THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT
Every litigant is guaranteed under our system of laws the
right to an impartial fact finder who is capable of making a
fair and reasonable assessment of the evidence and who is
able to apply the relevant law to that evidence.2 5 Requiring a
litigant to try a complicated lawsuit to a jury unable to under-
stand the case denies this fundamental right to a fair trial.
How can the seventh amendment requirement for jury trial in
all civil cases be satisfied if, as the evidence convincingly
shows, the jury is an incompetent fact finder in complex
cases? Some have urged that there is a "complex case" excep-
tion to the seventh amendment and others argue that complex
cases were properly classed as equitable causes of action in
England at the time of adoption of the seventh amendment
and hence are not entitled to jury trial in this country.
The seventh amendment guarantees a jury trial in suits at
common law. This has been interpreted to mean actions that
would have been classified as common law or legal actions in
1791, the year the amendment was adopted. 6 In the much
discussed case of Ross v. Bernhard,7 the Supreme Court set
forth in a footnote three criteria for determining whether an
issue is legal or equitable in nature in determining whether
" In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1079 (3d Cir. 1980).
so This principle was first set forth by Justice Story in Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S.
(3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830), and has continued to be the touchstone for determining the
right to a jury trial under the seventh amendment. See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415
U.S. 189 (1974); Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935). The
seventh amendment today clearly extends beyond common law actions as they ex-
isted in 1791. In Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974), the Court put to rest any
doubts that the seventh amendment right to jury trial applies to causes of action
enforcing statutory rights if the statute "creates legal rights and remedies, enforcea-
ble in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of law." Id. at 194. In Pernell v.
Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1973), the Court, noting it irrelevant whether a close
equivalent of an action existed in 1791 in England, reiterated its interpretation of the
phrase "suits at common law" as including "suits in which legal rights were to be
ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those, where equitable rights
alone were recognized .... [T]he amendment then may well be construed to em-
brace all suits which are not of equity and admiralty jurisdiction, whatever may be
the peculiar form which they may assume to settle legal rights." Id. at 374-75 (quot-
ing Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet) 433, 447 (1830)).
2- 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
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the seventh amendment right to a jury trial attaches.2" The
Court stated that federal courts should consider (1) the pre-
merger custom; (2) the remedy sought; and (3) "the practical
abilities and limitations of juries.""
Some courts have viewed the third prong of the Ross test,
concerning the abilities and limitations of juries, as establish-
ing a new standard for determining the right to a jury trial.30
Several circuit courts of appeal have applied all three prongs
of the Ross test in determining the right to a jury trial.31 The
Third and Ninth Circuits, however, have refused to attach
great weight to the third factor.32
" Ross was a shareholder's derivative action brought against corporate directors
which sought money damages on behalf of the corporation. The Court noted that the
claim of the corporation was the heart of the action, and held that if it presented a
legal issue, the plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial under the seventh amendment.
Id. at 538-39. This right was not lost because of the fact that the shareholders' right
to bring the action was an equitable issue which must first have been resolved by the
court. Id. at 539.
The holding in Ross rested on the Court's holdings in two prior cases, Dairy Queen,
Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962), and Beacon Theatres Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S.
500 (1959). These holdings were summarized in Ross as follows:
[W]here equitable and legal claims are joined in the same action, there
is a right to jury trial on the legal claims which must not be infringed
either by trying the legal issues as incidental to the equitable ones or
by a court trial of a common issue existing between the claims. The
Seventh Amendment question depends on the nature of the issue to be
tried rather than the character of the overall action.
Id. at 537-38.
I: Id. at 538 n.10.
0 See ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 458 F.
Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd on other grounds sub noma., Memorex Corp. v. Inter-
national Business Mach. Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Bernstein
v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re Boise Cascade Sec.
Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976). One court has interpreted Ross as requir-
ing a general analysis of the complexity of issues in determining the right to jury trial,
rather than a case-by-case analysis of the complexity of the litigation as a whole. See
Radial Lip Mach., Inc. v. International Carbide Corp., 76 F.R.D. 224, 226-28 (N.D. Ill.
1977).
31 See United States v. New Mexico, 642 F.2d 397 (10th Cir. 1981); Cox v. C. H.
Masland & Sons, Inc., 607 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1979); Minnis v. UAW, 531 F.2d 850
(8th Cir. 1975); Farmers-Peoples Bank v. United States, 477 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1973).
These decisions apply the Ross test without examining the controversy surrounding
its validity. None of these courts has concluded that a litigant is not entitled to a jury
trial on the basis that resolution of an issue is beyond the practical abilities and limi-
tations of the jury.
" See In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3rd Cir. 1980)
(the court noted that it was "unlikely that the Supreme Court would have announced
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A controversy also exists as to whether, prior to the adop-
tion of the seventh amendment, equity jurisdiction was exer-
cised over complex cases by the English courts.33 Lord Dev-
lin's thorough examination of this topic," in which he
concludes that English history supports the proposition that
complex cases were matters covered by equity jurisdiction, is
persuasive, but not conclusive. 8
IV. DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS
But there is a more persuasive basis upon which a jury de-
mand properly may, and should, be denied in the complex
case. One of the basic requirements of due process is "a fair
trial in a fair tribunal ... ."6 A litigant's right to due process
of law is denied by trial to a jury which cannot understand the
evidence and apply the relevant law to it.
The Supreme Court has recognized certain due process pro-
tections applicable to fact-finding processes.87 The Court has
held that procedural due process requires that "the deci-
an important new application of the seventh amendment in so cursory a fashion"); In
re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub noma.,
Gant v. Union Bank, 446 U.S. 929 (1980). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has
questioned the validity of the third prong of Ross, in view of the fact that it was not
reiterated in Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974), where the Court addressed the
issue of the seventh amendment right to jury trial in statutorily created claims. See
Barber v. Kimbrell's Inc., 577 F.2d 216 (4th Cir. 1978). In Pons v. Lorillard, 549 F.2d
950 (7th Cir. 1977), aff'd on other grounds, 434 U.S. 575 (1978), the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals applied the third prong of the Ross test in deciding that there is a
right to a jury trial in actions brought pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (Supp. 1981). In affirming the decision
reached by the court of appeals, the Supreme Court never referred to the Ross test.
See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
3 Compare Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury in Com-
plex Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 829 (1980), and Arnold, A Modest Replica-
tion to a Lengthy Discourse, 128 U. PA. L. REv 986 (1980) (both stating that there is
no evidence that complexity was a basis for equity jurisdiction in England), with
Campbell & LePoidevin, Complex Cases and Jury Trials: A Reply to Professor Ar-
nold, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 965 (1980) (Chancellors in England tried complex cases in
equity if the issues were beyond the jury's understanding.).
4 See Devlin, supra note 8, at 43-107.
See In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1080-84 (3d Cir.
1980).
" In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
87 See Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correction Complex, 442 U.S. 1
(1979); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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sionmaker's conclusion . . . rest solely on the legal rules and
evidence adduced at the hearing."8 8 In a case involving an in-
sane juror, the due process clause has been construed to pro-
tect a litigant from jurors incapable of rendering a verdict due
to incompetence.8 9 Practically, there is little difference be-
tween a juror incapable of rendering a verdict because of
mental incompetence and one incapable due to an inability to
understand the evidence and follow the law.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, speaking through Chief
Justice Seitz in the Japanese Electronic Products case,40 con-
cluded that requiring jury trial in a case too complex for a
jury to understand violates due process. Chief Judge Seitz de-
fined a case as too complex for a jury when "circumstances
render the jury unable to decide in a proper manner. ' "1 The
court further stated:
[T]he law presumes that a jury will find facts and reach a ver-
dict by rational means. It does not contemplate scientific preci-
sion but does contemplate a resolution of each issue on the ba-
sis of a fair and reasonable assessment of the evidence and a
fair and reasonable application of the relevant legal rules.4
The court further held that "due process precludes trial by
jury when a jury is unable to perform [its factfinding] task
with a reasonable understanding of the evidence and the legal
rules." 3
Thus, given the due process problem encountered in sub-
mitting the complex case to a jury, it will be necessary at
some time to resolve the conflict which arises between the
fifth and seventh amendments. When that resolution is made,
it must be remembered that the Supreme Court has consist-
ently declined to rule that the right guaranteed by the sev-
enth amendment is an essential element of ordered liberty
and has not required the states to grant jury trials via the
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 251, 271 (1970).
" See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
40 In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1079.
I d.
" Id. at 1084.
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fourteenth amendment." In resolving this conflict, however,
the fundamental right of due process guaranteed by the fifth
amendment necessarily weighs heavily in the balance.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the argument
that due process is violated by ordering jury trial in a complex
case in In re United States Financial Securities Litigation.4 5
This case involved alleged federal securities laws violations
with pendent common law claims. The district court esti-
mated that the fact finder would have to read over 100,000
pages of evidence, the equivalent of the first ninety volumes of
the Federal Reporter Second Series.46 The trial was expected
to last at least two years.' The issues requiring resolution in-
volved extremely complicated real estate financing transac-
tions, methods of reporting from many sources in a variety of
forms, and the valuation of securities.' The jury would have
been required to understand the accounts of the corporate de-
fendant over a period of years, and would have had to decide
if they accurately reflected the financial condition of the cor-
porate defendant and its many subsidiaries.' 9
The Ninth Circuit nevertheless concluded that juries are
competent fact finders in complex cases.50 The court reasoned
that cases that might appear complex at the threshold are
"synthesized into a coherent theory by the efforts of counsel"
by the time of trial.5 1 The court also emphasized that proper
pretrial management and use of procedural devices such as
pretrial motions under Rules 12 and 56 and appointment of
special masters under Rule 53 can organize and clarify the is-
,4 Id. at 1085 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324 (1934)). See Davis v.
Edwards, 409 U.S. 1098 (1973); Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden
Co., 284 U.S. 151, 158 (1931); Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. La.)
(Three-judge court), aff'd mem. sub nom., Hill v. McKeithen, 409 U.S. 943 (1972).
5 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nor., Gant v. Union Bank, 446
U.S. 929 (1980).
" Id. at 416 n.13
47 Id.
4 Id. at 429
" See In re United States Fin. Sec. Lit., 75 F.R.D. 702, 712-13 (S.D. Cal. 1977),
rev'd, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom., Gant v. Union Bank, 446
U.S. 929 (1980).
" 609 F.2d at 427.
51 Id.
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sues and make them understandable to lay jurors.2
Whether or not the assumptions underlying the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision are correct, the sincerest efforts of counsel to
present the evidence in a coherent manner will probably not
overcome the inherent inability of a randomly selected group
of citizen-jurors to render a reasonable decision in such a case.
The Ninth Circuit's judgment appears deficient, even assum-
ing the doubtful probability that a representative jury willing
to leave their homes and work places to sit on a case involving
a projected two-year trial could be found.
Moreover, the trial court's power to grant a motion for a
directed verdict or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
does not meet the due process problems raised by the possi-
bility of erroneous decisions by juries in complex cases."' Such
motions must be denied if the evidence would reasonably sup-
port a verdict for either side.5 4 This mechanism does not fill
the void created by an uncomprehending jury. Due process
demands a verdict based on the evidence and if the jury fails
to understand the evidence, this demand is unfulfilled. Nor
does blind faith in the duty of counsel to present the case in a
coherent fashion provide an adequate palliative to the com-
plex case problem. Cases involving concepts far outside the
normal experience of the average juror cannot be made under-
standable solely by an orderly presentation of evidence.
V. ALTERNATIVES TO THE JURY SYSTEM IN COMPLEX CIVIL
TRIALS
Those courts that have stricken jury demands, either on the
52 Id. at 428.
53 In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1086-87 (3d Cir.
1980).
See, e.g., O'Connor v. Pennsylvania R.R., 308 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1962). If a party
is not entitled to a verdict as a matter of law, the grant of a motion for a directed
verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict is considered an improper invasion
into the province of the jury. See Decato v. Travelers Ins. Co., 379 F.2d 796 (1st Cir.
1967). The same standard governs motions for directed verdict and motions for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict. See, e.g., California Computer Prod., Inc. v. Inter-
national Business Mach. Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979); Vander Zee v. Karabot-
sos, 589 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 962 (1979); Compton v.
United States, 377 F.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1967).
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basis of a complexity exception to the seventh amendment or
on due process grounds, have cautioned against this action in
all but the most unusual cases." I believe it is not only those
extreme examples of complex cases which are unsuitable for
trial by jury but many others as well. While I am realistic
enough to appreciate the practical difficulties to be overcome
in effecting a change in the seventh amendment, I believe this
change is necessary.
The seventh amendment right to jury trial should be abol-
ished, or at least modified so as to withhold it in cases where a
jury is not competent to discharge its responsibility. I agree
with Judge Frank's assessment: "[T]he jury is the worst possi-
ble enemy of this ideal of the 'supremacy of the law.' For
'jury-made law' is, par excellence, capricious and arbitrary,
yielding the maximum in the way of lack of uniformity, of
unknowability." ' The traditional notions that jurors bring a
collective wisdom to the jury room and render a better deci-
sion because of the group deliberative process are outmoded.5 7
In civil lawsuits, often with large sums of money at stake and
involving issues beyond the ordinary experience of most ju-
rors, these concepts have no application.
Nor does the oft-cited virtue that the jury is able to ignore
the strict rule of law and reach a result consistent with the
equities 8 have application in the complex civil context. While
this notion has some vitality in criminal cases, it is not only
inapplicable to civil cases,59 but also undesirable. Involved in
many civil lawsuits are interbusiness legal relationships be-
See In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1089 (3d Cir.
1980); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Radial
Lip Machine, Inc. v. International Carbide Corp., 76 F.R.D. 224, 228 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 132 (1949).
57 See C. JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY 25, 35 (1962), cited in Luneburg &
Nordenberg, Specially Qualified Juries and Expert Nonjury Tribunals: Alternative
for Coping with the Complexities of Modern Civil Litigation, 67 VA. L. REV 887, 888
n.9 (1981). See also infra note 106.
" See, e.g. Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil Juries and the Alloca-
tion of Judicial Power, 56 TEx. L. REV. 47, 56 (1977). See also W. FORSYTH, HISTORY
OF TRIAL BY JURY 354-82 (2d ed. 1875).
" See Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV.
289, 327 (1966).
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tween contracting parties and the issues between them should
be decided under the law and the facts. A system which lauds
the abrogation of the rule of law in favor of the "equities"
brings injustice and encourages inconsistent results with a re-
sulting unpredictability in legal relationships.
In a similar vein, the jury has often been championed as the
protector of the people from the tyranny of government.60
This is undoubtedly a valid argument in support of a jury in
criminal cases, but the seventh amendment was adopted for
the protection of debtors in diversity cases, the frustration of
unwise legislation, the reversal of the practices of the vice-ad-
miralty courts, vindication of the interests of private citizens
in litigation with the government, and the protection of liti-
gants from oppressive judges." Many of these concerns
originated in the English domination of the colonies"2 but are
of doubtful force today. Finally, to the extent jury trial pro-
motes the affirmative democratic value of involving lay people
in the operation of government, this value is more than ade-
quately promoted by jury service in criminal trials, which in
parts of the country threaten to engulf the court dockets.
If complex cases should not be decided by a jury, then how
should they be resolved? Few people would seriously suggest
that a trial to the court is not a fair trial. We are the only
nation in the world which still requires jury trials in civil
cases." England, from which we drew our jury tradition, sub-
stantially abandoned civil jury trials forty years ago as a result
of wartime conditions. Moreover, in this country no jury right
exists in equity,"' admiralty or maritime matters,65 immigra-
tion cases,66 habeas corpus petitions.6 7 Federal Tort Claims
"0 See W. FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 218-19 (2nd ed. 1875).
61 Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L.
REV. 639, 670-71 (1973).
62 See DETocQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 293 (1835).
63 See P. DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 131 (1966).
" See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970); Shields v. Thomas, 59 U.S. (18 How.)
253, 262 (1856).
" Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 45 (1932). There exists a statutory exception for
admiralty cases arising on the Great Lakes. 28 U.S.C. § 1873 (1976).
8 U.S.C. § 1357 (1976).
'4 Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966).
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Act cases,6 8 Fair Labor Standards Act injunctions,69 NLRA
cases,70 or Longshoremen and Harbor Workers cases.71 Ad-
ministrative agencies 72 and the Tax Court73 decide issues
without assistance of juries. In general, all statutory proceed-
ings in which the government is a party created since 1791
have no provisions for, and the Constitution does not require,
a jury trial.74 Yet no complaint is made that the litigants are
not fairly treated in these matters. If a federal judge, sitting
alone, is qualified to decide the issues of fact and law relating
to contract when specific performance is sought, why is the
same judge not qualified to decide the same issues without a
jury when only damages are demanded?
There are also practical considerations which would be well
served by limiting use of the civil jury. Jury trials take longer
than court trials. 5 In a bench trial it is not necessary for
counsel to present the same amount of evidence to familiarize
the court with the concepts as is often necessary in jury trials.
Arguments are usually much shorter and the judge can read
depositions on his own time, rather than listening to counsel
consume everyone's time reading them into the record. Issues
can more easily be bifurcated. There is no need for instruc-
tions, and naturally no jury deliberation. A bench trial is over-
whelmingly more efficient than a jury trial.
The jury system, on the other hand, is extremely inefficient.
Most jurors spend a major portion of their time waiting long
hours in jury assembly rooms - a loss of productivity as well
as an expense to society.76 In the federal system approxi-
as 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1978). At common law, the sovereign could not be sued except
with its consent. McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426, 440 (1880).
69 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1965 & Supp. 1981); Marshall v. Elm Hill, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 312
(D. Vt. 1979).
70 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp,, 301 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1937).
7- 33 U.S.C. § 919 (1978).
71 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 447 (1944).
" Maher v. Commissioner, 576 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1978).
7,! See Lehman v. Nakshian, 101 S. Ct. 2698, 2701 (1981).
75 FJC STUDY, supra note 9, at 44.
71 See NATIONAL COLLEGE OF STATE JUDICIARY, JURY 39-41 (1975). A survey con-
ducted of New York City jurors indicated that 61.8% of juror time was spent in the
waiting room. See Simon, The Juror in New York City: Attitudes and Experiences,
61 A.B.A.J. 207, 208 (1975).
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mately $25 million dollars was spent in fiscal year 1980 for
petit jury fees and expenses alone."
Abrogation or substantial modification of our jury tradition
will take time, however, and undoubtedly is far in the future.
In the meantime, there are other alternatives to civil jury
trial. There can be greater utilization of arbitration and medi-
ation procedures, especially in commercial disputes.7 8 For ex-
ample, California law authorizes the parties by agreement to
retain retired judges to resolve disputes by holding court in
regular courtrooms, and issuing decisions binding on the par-
ties.7 9 Litigants are invoking this procedure with increasing
regularity.80
In the area of complex litigation, the use of special or "blue
ribbon" juries and expert nonjury tribunals, as in many civil
law countries, should be permitted. Instead of a system which
tends to exclude those persons most capable of deciding cases,
either because they are unable to serve on longer cases or be-
cause lawyers often think it advantageous preemptorily to
challenge the better qualified jurors, a system can be devel-
oped whereby better qualified jurors are purposefully chosen
for service.
Such a system would require modified jury selection proce-
dures that remain sensitive to the cross-representational prin-
ciples present in our current law.81 The educational equivalent
of a bachelor's degree would be a practical measure of re-
quired juror competence.82
77 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, JUROR UTILIZATION IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 29 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Juror Utilization].
The jury system is becoming increasingly expensive. The cost of petit juror payments
rose 31.3% between 1979 and 1980. Id.
78 For a discussion of arbitration and mediation procedures, see Devitt, Federal
Civil Jury Trials Should be Abolished, 60 A.B.A.J. 570, 574 (1974).
7' CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1280-1289 (West 1972).
so Terry, Rent-a-Judge: A Fast Way to a 'Day in Court', Christian Sci. Monitor,
Feb. 9, 1982, at 1.
" Luneburg & Nordenberg, Specially Qualified Juries and Expert Nonjury
Tribunals: Alternatives for Coping with the Complexities of Modern Civil Litiga-
tion, 67 VA. L. REV. 887, 888 n.9 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Luneburg &
Nordenberg].
as See id. But see Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in Complex Civil Litigation, 92
HARV. L. REV. 898, 916 (1979) (the problem is one of assembling jurors versed in the
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Use of special juries would require modification of the Jury
Selection and Service Act of 1968,3 which requires as a policy
matter that all citizens have the opportunity to serve on ju-
ries.8 4 Such modifications can be made consistent with the re-
quirements of the Constitution. The use of such specially
qualified juries has a strong historical basis in common law,
and was a practice in England prior to the adoption of the
seventh amendment.85
The Supreme Court has never set forth the exact cross-rep-
resentation required under the seventh amendment.8 8 The
seventh amendment's preservation of the right to trial by jury
in "suits at common law" on its face preserves jury trial right
for certain kinds of cases, but does not govern other jury trial
incidents which are mere matters of form or procedure, such
as the size of the jury.87 Whether the representiveness of the
jury is of constitutional dimensions under the seventh amend-
ment is unclear,8 8 but it is noteworthy that the Supreme
Court has upheld the use of a special jury in a criminal case.8'
In considering the constitutionality of the use of special ju-
ries in complicated civil cases, the strong historical basis for
the use of special juries and the Supreme Court's prior ap-
proval of the practice provide strong support for the proposi-
intricacies of complex litigation: "Poets, philosophers, chemists, and priests may ex-
hibit extraordinary intelligence and still be only slightly better equipped than others
to handle the tasks of a jury in a massive antitrust suit.").
83 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1874 (1976).
Id. § 1861.
" Luneberg & Nordenberg, supra note 81, at 902-03.
" See Luneburg & Nordenberg, supra note 81, at 916-26. In a civil case involving a
challenge to juries on this ground, the Court's decision reversing the verdict was
based on its supervisory powers over the courts rather than on constitutional grounds.
See Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
"T See, e.g., Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 152-57 (1963).
88 But see Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973). In holding that a six person jury
does not violate the seventh amendment, the Court stated: "What is required for a
'jury' is a number large enough to facilitate group deliberation combined with a likeli-
hood of obtaining a representative cross section of the community." Id. at 160 n.16. It
is possible that the requirement of a college degree would have the desired minimum
impact on representativeness, since a college education is now attained by persons in
every segment of society. To the extent that cognizable groups are underrepresented,
selection procedures could be modified to accommodate the interest in maintaining
cross section representation. See Luneberg & Nordenberg, supra note 81, at 945-49.
8 See Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
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tion that the seventh amendment allows their use. Moreover,
the Court has emphasized on several occasions the permissi-
bility of utilizing new devices to keep the jury system respon-
sive to the changing needs of the judicial system."
Another possible alternative to the use of civil juries is the
statutory creation of non-jury expert tribunals, in the nature
of administrative adjudicatory agencies, to decide complex
cases." The constitutionality of this type of forum must be
examined in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Atlas
Roofing Co. v. OSHA." In that case the Court had before it
the issue of whether Congress may create a new cause of ac-
tion in the United States for the enforcement of civil penalties
where there is no right to jury trial. In a unanimous decision,
the Court held that where "public rights" are being litigated,
the Congress may designate a non-jury forum for the adjudi-
cation of issues." It has been suggested that the concept of
"public rights" could be applied to both old and new statutory
causes of action,"' such as any case where Congress has cre-
ated substantive rights and remedies in response to the inade-
quacies of common law actions existing in 1971. Cases brought
before a tribunal of this sort could be appealed to Article III
courts." Another alternative is to provide Article III courts
with the option of referring complex issues in a case to the
expert tribunal, much in the way "primary jurisdiction" refer-
ences are made to administrative agencies."
We need to take a fresh look at the jury system. The Su-
preme Court has already been doing this in recent years as
" See, e.g., Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973) (citing Ex Parte Peterson,
253 U.S. 300, 309-10 (1920)); Funk v. United States, 290 U. S. 371, 382 (1933). In Fay
v. New York, the special jury statute upheld by the Court provided for the use of a
special jury where " 'the due, efficient and impartial administration of justice in the
particular case would be advanced ....... 332 U.S. at 268-69 (quoting N.Y. JUD.
LAW § 749-994 (McKinney 1901)).
' See generally Luneburg & Nordenberg supra note 81, at 950-1007.
2 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
3' Id. at 450.
See Luneberg & Nordenberg, supra note 81, at 975-97.
See id.
See id. at 998.
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shown in Williams v. Florida,7 upholding the use of a six-
member jury in a state criminal proceeding. Despite the
strong influence of history and tradition the Court found that
it had to consider "other than purely historical considerations
to determine which features of the jury system, as it existed at
common law, were preserved in the Constitution."' Just two
years later, in 1972, the Court continued its new look at tradi-
tional views of the jury and upheld less-than-unanimous state
jury verdicts in criminal cases.9" The following year, in Col-
grove v. Battin,1'" the Supreme Court upheld a local rule of
the Montana federal district court providing for six-member
juries for the trial of all civil cases. Eighty-six of the ninety-
five United States district courts now have local rules provid-
ing for juries of less than twelve in civil cases. 110 Marked pro-
gress is being made in modernizing our judicial machinery to
respond to modern needs.
While trial by jury in criminal cases has been widely sup-
ported by the bench and bar and by legal writers, use of juries
in civil cases often has been criticized. Justice Cardozo wrote,
"Few would be so narrow or provincial as to maintain that a
fair and enlightened system of justice would be impossible
without" civil jury trials.10 2 The distinguished Professor Flem-
ing James, Jr. proposed in the Yale Law Journal in 1936 that,
"the right of jury should not be expanded. This method of
settling disputes is expensive and dilatory - perhaps anach-
ronistic."108 The highly respected Judge Learned Hand ob-
served in 1921 that he was "by no means enamored of jury
trials, at least in civil cases."104
To summarize the current views of many distinguished crit-
97 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
" Id. at 99.
See Apocada v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356
(1972).
l®413 U.S. 149 (1973).
101 JUROR UTILIZATION, supra note 77, at A-126-34.
101 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
103 Fleming, Trial by Jury and the New Federal Rules of Procedure, 45 YALE L.J.
1022, 1026 (1936).
10 J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIALS 124 (1950).
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ics, 105 Circuit Judge John Minor Wisdom of the Fifth Circuit
stated:
It is presumptuous and chauvinistic to argue that civil trials in
such countries as France and Germany and the Scandinavian
countries are unfair. It is paradoxical and anachronistic to as-
sert that the civil jury of 1791 is necessary to assure fair trials
in suits at common law in this country when civil juries have
been all but done away with in England, the source of the com-
mon law.1°6
IV. CONCLUSION
Mark Twain was right 100 years ago in questioning the
competence and utility of the American jury system. We
should preserve its use for criminal trials where it effectively
serves as the "Palladium of Liberty," but continuing its re-
quired availability for trial of all civil cases is unwise and an-
tagonistic to fair trials and the efficient administration of jus-
tice. Unlike the British, we have a written Constitution
guaranteeing a jury trial "in suits at common law where the
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars . . . .,o It
will take many years to satisfy two-thirds of the membership
of each body of Congress and three-fourths of the state legis-
latures of the the wisdom of repealing or substantially modify-
ing the compulsory jury trial provisions of the seventh amend-
ment. For good or evil, amendment of our Constitution is a
"' Senator Robert A. Taft, Jr. told the Cincinnati Bar Association on April 15,
1971, that the time had come to question seriously the institutions of the civil jury
and called it a reform long overdue. Taft, The Question of Curtailing the Size and
Use of Juries, Pro, in The U.S. Jury System, Pros & Cons, 50 CONG. DIG. 193, 210
(1971).
'00 Davis v. Edwards, 409 U.S. 1098 (1973); Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F. Supp.
1025, 1035 (E.D. La.) (three-judge court), aff'd mem. sub noma., Hill v. McKeithen,
409 U.S. 943 (1972). Professor Gilmore speculates that distrust of the jury in contract
cases led the 19th century American courts to convert and distort almost all questions
of fact into questions of law in order to control the arbitrary power of the jury. This
development was part of an exaggerated tendency to make American contract law
scientific and overly complex in contrast to developments in France, Germany and
Scandinavia. G. GILMORE, The Death of Contract 99 (1974).
'07 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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difficult and time-consuming process."0 8
This does not mean that we should not advocate constitu-
tional change and work for general public understanding of
the need for it. The bench, the bar and the law school commu-
nities are best qualified to afford leadership in the movement
for change. While working for it, we can look forward to court
decisions and legislation which may, in part at least, remedy
some of the described problems occasioned by obligatory jury
trial. The most pressing of these problems relates to the com-
plex case. It would be helpful if the Supreme Court would re-
solve the conflict between the Third and Ninth Circuits as to
the requirement for jury trial in protracted and complex busi-
ness litigation. Involved is a confrontation between the sev-
enth amendment requirement of a jury trial and the fifth
amendment due process clause requirement of a fair trial by a
jury able to understand and competently decide the factual
and legal issues. I suggest that this decision, when it comes,
will be viewed as a landmark.
The Supreme Court may thus have occasion to explain what
it meant in Ross v. Bernhard when it said that "the practical
abilities and limitations of juries"'10 9 is a factor to be consid-
ered in determining whether an issue is legal, requiring a jury
trial, or is equitable. The Court may also decide whether, as
Lord Devlin tells us, English history shows that complex cases
were administered by the chancellor and not by the law
courts, and hence jury trial in complex cases is not required
under the seventh amendment."x0 But absent constitutional
amendment, or enlightened judicial decisions, the problems of
which we speak can be met by legislation authorizing special
juries and expert non-jury tribunals as are commonly used in
European countries.
The burden of my message is that we need change in our
legal machinery to respond to change in the times. The civil
108 It took, for example, many years to repeal the unpopular 18th (Prohibition)
Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (1919, repealed 1933).
' Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970). See supra notes 27-32 and
accompanying text.
110 See generally Devlin, supra note 8.
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jury today is an anachronism, best illustrated by its inade-
quacy to respond to the demands of complex and protracted
litigation of the twentieth century. I urge your concern and
support for this change in the interest of ensuring fair trials
and improving the administration of justice.
